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iv

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Appeals pursuant to an Order of the Utah
Supreme Court transferring jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals under the authority of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (1953, as amended). A copy of the Order is set forth in
the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the Declaration?

The interpretation of a contract presents a question of law. Therefore this Court
will review the trial court's interpretation for correctness, granting no deference to the
trial court's conclusion. Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004
UT 54, % 6, 94 P.3d 292.
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 259.
2.

Did the trial court err in concluding that there were no genuine issues of

material fact precluding an award of summary judgment to Wendy's?
In reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment, the Court is obligated to
view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and to review the trial court's legal conclusions, as well as the
grant of summary judgment as a whole, for correctness. Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust,
2004 UT 85ffl[2, 10, 100 P.3d 1200.

1

This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 259.
3.

Did the trial court err in determining that the new signs constructed by

Wendy's on Parcel Three are authorized by the Declaration?
The interpretation of a contract presents a question of law. Therefore this Court
will review the trial court's interpretation for correctness, granting no deference to the
trial court's conclusion. Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004
UT 54,16, 94 P.3d 292.
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 259.
4.

Did the trial court err in determining that the Plaintiffs' trespass and breach

of contract claims were barred by the statute of limitations?
The Court will review this question giving no deference to the decision of the trial
court and reviewing it to determine whether the trial court's decision was clearly
erroneous. Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2004 UT App 436, 104
P.3d 646.
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 259.
5.

Did the trial court err in enjoining the Plaintiffs from taking any action to

interfere with Wendy's use of the drive-through facilities located on Plaintiffs' property?

2

This issue presents a mixed question of fact and law. This Court will review the
trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. Because the facts were determined in the
context of a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.
Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85ffi[2, 10, 100 P.3d 1200.
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 259.
6.

Did the trial court err in awarding attorneys' fees to Wendy's?

An award of attorneys' fees is discretionary with the trial court and will therefore
be reviewed by this Court to determine if the trial court committed patent error or if the
award constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d
325.
This issue was preserved for review in the Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Affidavit and Award of Attorneys' Fees. R. at 352.
RELEVANT STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56
The full text of these statutes and rules is set forth in the Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Defendant/Appellee Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York,

Inc. ("Wendy's") owns the real property located at 3259 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah (the "Wendy's Property"), on which is located a restaurant building and related
improvements. R. at 119, f 1.
2.

The Wendy's Property is adjacent to the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the

"Shopping Center"), which is owned by Plaintiffs/Appellants (hereinafter "Plaintiffs").
R. at 119,^2.
3.

Both the Wendy's Property and the Shopping Center are included in the

property described in a Declaration, which was recorded in the office of the Salt Lake
County Recorder on September 24, 1982 as Entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page
823. A copy of the Declaration is included in the Addendum to this brief. R. at 119, ^f 3.
4.

The Declaration identifies three distinct parcels of property within the

property described therein. The Wendy's Property is located within what the Declaration
refers to as "Parcel Three." R. at 119, ^J 5.
5.

The Wendy's Property was developed as a Burger King restaurant in or

about 1982. R. at 120,16.
6.

At the time the Burger King restaurant was constructed on the Wendy's

Property in or about 1982, a drive-through lane was also constructed on the north side of
the Wendy's Property. The drive-through lane is bounded on the north by a narrow,
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landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, and on the south by the restaurant (the
drive-through lane and related island are referred to hereinafter as the "Drive-Through
Facilities"). Rat 120, f 7.
7.

The Drive-Through Facilities extend from the northwest comer of the

restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto the Plaintiffs' property.
R. at 80, If 11.
8.

The Plaintiffs' property which is encumbered by the Drive-Through

Facilities is identified in the Declaration as "Common Area" of the Shopping Center. R.
at 80, f 11.
9.

The Declaration contains an Exhibit A, referred to as the Plot Plan. The

Plot Plan is a proposed site plan for the Canyon Rim Shopping Center. R. at 79, ^f 6.
10.

The Plot Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities as two curved lines

running from the northwest comer of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to
the northeast. R. at 7.
11.

With respect to Parcel Three, the Declaration provides that "[n]o building

featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be located on Parcel Three,
except as shown on the Plot Plan . . . . " R. at 38.
12.

The physical relationship between the location of the Wendy's building and

the Drive-Through Facilities as shown on the Plot Plan is not consistent in scale with the
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physical location of the Wendy's building and Drive-Through Facilities as physically
located on the ground. R. at 280, ^ 8.
13.

The Wendy's building, as built, begins approximately 8 feet ± farther from

the North edge of the 33rd South right-of-way and is approximately 13 feet longer than
the building shown on the Plot Plan. R. at 280, f 9.
14.

With respect to signage on Parcel Three, the Declaration states that:
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct
two (2) free-standing pylon, monument or other signs at the
location designated on the Plot Plan as "Parcel Three Sign."
No other pylon, monument or other free-standing sign shall
be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written
approval of all Owners . . . .
R. at 39, 40.

15.

In November, 2002, Wendy's became aware that the Drive-Through

Facilities then being operated by Burger King encroached upon Plaintiffs' property
through a survey commissioned by Wendy's and performed by Larsen & Malmquist. R.
at 151, <h 3; 261, f 1.
16.

Shortly thereafter a representative of Wendy's contacted Mark Papanikolas

to inquire about purchasing an easement over Plaintiffs' property. R. at 261, ^f 2.
17.

In December, 2002, Plaintiffs notified Wendy's that Plaintiffs would not

allow drive-through facilities to be located on Plaintiffs' property without compensation
being paid to Plaintiffs. R. at 261, ^ 3.
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18.

On or about February 28, 2003, Wendy's purchased the Burger King

Restaurant property located at 3259 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah and converted
the restaurant from a Burger King to a Wendy's. R. at 262, ^f 4.
19.

Following the purchase by Wendy's of the Burger King property, Wendy's

replaced the Burger King free-standing signs and added additional free-standing and
monument signs, at least one of which was constructed on Plaintiffs' property, and a new
fence. R. at 2 6 2 4 5; 2871.
20.

Wendy's is currently maintaining the drive-through facilities

and

landscaped area as shown on the Larsen & Malmquist survey to be on Plaintiffs' property
and has planted and continues to maintain flowers, shrubs and grass on Plaintiffs'
property, together with one of Wendy's signs. R. at 262, ^f 6.
21.

In addition to a pylon sign along 3300 South at the south end of the

Wendy's Property, and a directional sign located on the Drive-Through Facilities,
Wendy's also constructed two additional menu-board signs on the Wendy's Property (the
"Menu-Board Signs"). R. at 254, U 5, 283, ^ 8-9.
22.

The Declaration provides that in the event legal proceedings are brought to

enforce any provision of the Declaration as against any party with an interest in the
property described therein, "the successful party in such action shall then be entitled to
1

Page 287 of the Record is a photograph which clearly shows a rod-iron fence along the
western boundary of Parcel Three, extending onto Plaintiffs' property. It is obvious this
was constructed by Wendy's as the Larsen & Malmquist survey, located at page 8 of the
Record, identifies a chain-link fence at the same location.
7

receive and shall receive from the defaulting owner or party a reasonable sum as
attorneys' fees and costs to be fixed by the Court in the same action." R. at 47.
23.

In July, 2004, Plaintiffs filed suit against Wendy's alleging trespass and

breach of contract based on the location of Wendy's Drive-Through Facilities on
Plaintiffs' property. R. at 1.
24.

Wendy's brought a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' claims

and on Wendy's counterclaims on September 30, 2005. R. at 114.
25.

A hearing was held on Wendy's motion on December 12, 2005. R. at 306.

26.

On December 12, 2005, the Court entered a Minute Entry, granting

Wendy's Motion for Summary Judgment. A copy of the Minute Entry is included in the
addendum to this brief. In the Minute Entry the Court states:
After reviewing the record in this matter, as well as the
applicable Utah law, the Court finds the proper focus in a
statute of limitations analysis is the time at which the cause of
action accrued, not the identity of the parties involved. See
Utah Dep't of Envlt. Quality v Redd, 2002 UT 50, ^ 16, 48
P.3d 230 {citing Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-1). While the
Plaintiffs' suggest the trespass is continuing, rather than
permanent and, therefore, their lawsuit is timely, the Court
disagrees. At issue in this case is a landscaped island edged
with concrete curbing, which is considerably more permanent
than the pile of "rocks, soil, and other debris" which
constituted the act of trespass contested in Brieggar
Properties, L.C v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 1953, p.
11, 52 P.3d 1133. This said, it is undisputed the alleged
trespass and breach of the Declaration occurred in or about
1982 and, consequently, the causes of action are time barred.
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Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted. Defendant is asked to prepare
the appropriate affidavit of fees and submit the same for
consideration by the Court.
R. at 307.
27.

On January 9, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal. R. at 314.

28.

Notwithstanding the Court's direction in its December 12, 2005 Minute

Entry to submit the "appropriate affidavit of fees," on January 17, 2006, Wendy's
submitted proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, a proposed Final Judgment
and an Affidavit of Costs and Fees. R. at 384, 321.
29.

On January 25, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Voluntary Notice of Dismissal of

their Appeal. R. at 359.
30.

On January 27, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an Objection to Proposed Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Affidavit and Award of Attorneys Fees. R.
at 352.
31.

On March 21, 2006, the Court entered a Minute Entry finding Plaintiffs'

objections to the Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and
Affidavit and Award of Fees to be "without merit." A copy of the Court's Minute Entry
is included in the Addendum to this brief. R. at 373.
32.

The Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Final

Judgment in this matter on March 21, 2006. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and the Final Judgment are included in the Addendum to this brief. R. at 375.
9

33.

This appeal followed. R. at 397.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

There are two fundamental issues in this matter. The first is whether the trial court
correctly interpreted the Declaration which governs the parties' rights and obligations
relating to the property at issue. The second issue is whether or not Plaintiffs' claims are
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On both issues, the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to Wendy's was erroneous.
In its interpretation of the Declaration, the trial court reached the conclusion that
the Drive-Through Facilities currently being used by Wendy's were constructed in
accordance with the Declaration. The plain language of the Declaration requires some
subjective application of fact to the language of the Declaration to determine whether or
not the improvements and facilities at issue were constructed in accordance with the
Declaration. The trial court, despite the existence of completely contradictory affidavits
from the parties, determined on summary judgment that the improvements, as built, were
authorized by the Declaration. This determination was in error and requires reversal.
On the statute of limitations question, the court determined that Plaintiffs' breach
of contract and trespass claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The
trial court found that the trespass at issue was permanent, as opposed to continuing
within the meaning of Utah law. However, the court's determination rests on a faulty
analysis and understanding of the relevant and applicable case law and mischaracterizes
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the trespass as permanent when it is actually continuing. It also ignores undisputed facts
presented in affidavits and other evidence that demonstrated that Wendy's installed
additional improvements on Plaintiffs' property within the period of the relevant statute
of limitations.
Finally, it should be noted that while the court found that Plaintiffs' trespass and
breach of contract claims were barred, it also found that Wendy's had trespassed on
Plaintiffs' property. It then concluded that, notwithstanding the fact that Wendy's had
trespassed, the improvements which constituted the trespass were permitted by the
Declaration. This obviously inconsistent Judgment requires reversal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
DECLARATION AUTHORIZES MAINTENANCE AND USE OF THE
DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITIES AS THEY CURRENTLY EXIST.
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in this matter, under the

heading "Conclusions of Law," the trial court determined:
9.

Although the Declaration generally forbids the
construction of improvements on common areas, it
expressly authorizes Drive Through Facilities located on
Parcel Three as shown on the Plot Plan.

10. The Drive Through Facilities are consequently excepted
from the Declaration's general prohibition of
improvements on the Common Area and are, in fact,
expressly permitted.
11. Because the Drive Through Facilities are expressly
permitted by the Declaration, Wendy's is entitled to a
11

declaratory judgment decreeing that the Drive Through
Facilities may remain in use in their present location and
configuration.
R. at 380. Whether noted as a finding of fact or conclusion of law, this particular
determination of the trial court is in error as it is completely inconsistent with the actual
terms of the Declaration. Additionally, it was determined by the Court on a Motion for
Summary Judgment, and there were material facts at issue which, under the relevant law,
precluded the Court's grant of summary judgment to Wendy's.
A.

The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Declaration was Incorrect.

The rights of the parties to this matter regarding the use of the property at issue
are generally set forth in a Declaration of Restrictions and Grant of Easements which was
considered and reviewed by the trial court. That document is set forth at pp. 27-58 of the
Record. Paragraph VI. A. sets forth restrictions relating to the property and provides, in
part:
No building featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through
traffic shall be located on Parcel Three, except as shown on
the Plot Plan, without the prior written consent of the Owner
of Parcel Two and ASPI, including consent to the location of
the drive-in, drive-up or drive-through lanes of such facility.
R. at 38. Thus, the actual location of its building and the Drive-Through Facilities for the
Wendy's Restaurant on Parcel 3 are at issue.
The construction of the Declaration in this matter is a question of law. Covey v.
Covey, 2003 UT App 380 f 16, 80 P.3d 553. Additionally, Utah Courts have noted that
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the basic rule of contract interpretation is that in interpreting a contract, the intentions of
the parties are controlling, and the court is required to give effect to the meaning intended
by the parties at the time they entered into the agreement. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v.
Hardy, 2005 UT App 92 f 12, 110 P.3d 168. Finally, a contract should be interpreted so
as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, which terms should be given
effect if it is possible to do so. LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Utah
1988). The trial court determined that the Declaration's statement about the location of a
building on Parcel Three allowed the construction, maintenance and exclusive use of
drive-through facilities on Plaintiffs' property, not on Wendy's property. This
determination was erroneous as a matter of law.
First, there is not a single word in the Declaration that would allow the DriveThrough Facilities serving the use on Parcel Three to be constructed anywhere other than
on Parcel Three. Wendy's claim relies completely on the Plot Plan attached to the
Declaration. That plan shows, at best, a sliver of a portion of the drive-through to overlap
onto Plaintiffs' property. However, nowhere on the Plot Plan is any of the landscape
buffer for the drive-through shown as being on Plaintiffs' property, nor does it show
anything close to the magnitude of the encroachment of the drive-through lane itself onto
Plaintiffs' property. In addition, even if a small portion of the drive-through lane were
allowed by the Declaration to encroach on Plaintiffs' property, the Declaration does not

13

contemplate that the owner of Parcel Three would have exclusive use of the Plaintiffs'
property, or any use without reasonable compensation being paid to Plaintiffs.
The trial court's determination is very difficult to understand in light of the
evidence in the Record. A copy of the Plot Plan is included in the Record at p. 52. In
addition to the Plot Plan, there are two surveys provided for the property which show the
actual location, as constructed, of the building and the Drive-Through Facilities on the
property at issue. Those surveys are included in the Record at pp. 156 and 158. The
surveys clearly show that the actual encroachment of the Wendy's Drive-Through
Facilities is significantly greater than the very minor encroachment suggested on the Plot
Plan and includes the entire width of the drive-through lane and the landscaped island on
the northern edge. The Drive-Through Facilities on Parcel Three were not constructed as
shown on the Plot Plan.
B.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluded the Court's Award of
Summary Judgment.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
(emphasis added). It is well settled law that if there are any genuine issues of material
fact, summary judgment is inappropriate. Lovendahl v. Jordan School Dist, 2002 UT
130, 63 P.3d 705. In fact, Utah courts have gone so far as to state: "it only takes one
14

sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy
and create an issue of fact." Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975), W.
M. Barnes Company v. Sohio Natural Resources Company, 627 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah
1981).
In this case, the trial court apparently accepted the opinion of the Defendant's
witness Randy Smith, which was submitted via affidavit. However, Plaintiffs had
submitted a contrary opinion in the affidavit of Mark Babbitt. These contrary opinions on
the issue of whether or not the Wendy's drive-through was constructed "on Parcel
Three," "as shown in the Plot Plan" create a genuine issue of material fact.
The Affidavit of Randy D. Smith submitted by Wendy's, states:
8.

The "Plot Plan" appended as Exhibit "A" to the
declaration shows the building now owned by Wendy's
located in the southwest corner of Parcel Three and also
shows, by two curved lines located just off the
northwest corner of the Wendy's building, the drive
through facility which serves the Wendy's building.

9.

It is my professional opinion that the curved lines on the
Plot Plan depict a drive through facility in the same
location as the drive through facility that is shown on
the LMI Survey and the B&G Surveys and which
currently serves the Wendy's restaurant.

10. The Plot Plan is labeled as "Proposed Site Plan," which
is indicative of a preliminary layout, not an as [sic]
constructed drawing or a survey. The physical
relationship, however, between the location of the
restaurant building and drive through as shown on the
Plot Plan is fully consistent in scale with the physical
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location of the building and drive through facility as
physically located on the ground.
R. at 152. In response to the opinion of Mr. Smith, the Plaintiffs produced an affidavit
from Mr. Babbitt, who is also a professional engineer. In his affidavit, Mr. Babbitt does
not simply draw conclusions, as Mr. Smith did, but sets forth detailed measurements from
an actual physical inspection of the property based upon one of the ALTA surveys as
referenced in the Record. Based upon his examination of the survey and his actual
physical inspection of the property, Mr. Babbitt testified in his affidavit as follows:
8.

The Plot Plan is labeled as "Proposed Site Plan," which
is indicative of a preliminary layout, not as a
constructed drawing or a survey. The physical
relationship between the location of the restaurant
building and drive thru as shown on the Plot Plan is not
consistent in scale with the physical location of the
building and drive thru facility as physically located on
the ground.

9.

The dimensions I have listed in Items 4 and 7 above,
although only approximate, show a significant
difference in the location of the building and the drive
thru window access. The building on Exhibit A is 30
feet ± from the North right-of-way line versus 38.3 feet
on the survey. The building in Exhibit A is
approximately 64 feet long versus 76.9 feet on the
survey. The North property line in Exhibit A is
approximately 46 feet from the building versus 25.2 feet
in the survey. The North edge of the access for the drive
thru window in Exhibit A angles to the Southwest and is
from 2 feet to over 10 feet closer to Wendy's north
property line than the access shown on Wendy's survey.
Approximately 480 square feet of the access lane shown
on the Larsen Survey is North of the North edge of the
access lane shown on Exhibit 'A'.
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R. at 280-281. (emphasis added)
Clearly, Mr. Babbitt's conclusions were completely opposite from Mr. Smith's. As such,
Mr. Babbitt's affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the court's
determination that the Drive-Through Facilities were constructed as shown on the Plot
Plan was inappropriate on summary judgment. As a result, the court's award of
Summary Judgment to the Defendant was contrary to the standards of Utah law.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE NEW SIGNS
CONSTRUCTED BY WENDY'S ON PARCEL THREE ARE
AUTHORIZED BY THE DECLARATION.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter, the trial court

determined:
12. The court further rejects plaintiffs' contention that the
Declaration prohibits Wendy's from maintaining Menu
Board Signs.
The Declaration prohibits any "pylon, monument or
13. other free-standing sign" on Parcel Three in addition to
the pair of free standing signs expressly permitted
thereby. The Declaration, however, does not prohibit
Menu Board Signs.
Moreover, the Declaration expressly contemplates and
14. permits the operation of a drive through restaurant on
Parcel Three. Signage like Menu Board Signs is an
inherently necessary feature of modern drive through
restaurants.
Wendy's is entitled to a declaratory judgment decreeing
15. that the Menu Board Signs may remain in use in their
present location and configuration.
17

R. at 380-381. This determination of the trial court is contrary to the express, written
terms of the Declaration and is incorrect as a matter of law.
Section VII of the Declaration deals specifically with signage, wherein it states:
The Owners of Parcels One and Two shall have the right to
construct from time to time any sign or signs it deems
advisable on its parcels.
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct
two (2) free-standing pylon, monument or other signs at the
location designated on the Plot Plan as "Parcel Three Sign."
No other pylon, monument or other free-standing sign shall
be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written
approval of all Owners andASPL
R. at 39-40. (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that in addition to the two pylon signs located on Parcel Three,
Wendy's has constructed two free standing Menu-Board Signs on Parcel Three. R. at
122. These signs were constructed without asking for or obtaining any approval, written
or otherwise. However, notwithstanding this fact, the trial court concluded that the new
signs constructed on Parcel Three by Wendy's are not in violation of the express terms of
the Declaration. Utah law on construction of contracts requires that "[e]ach contract
provision is to be considered in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving
effect to all and ignoring none." Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-1062
(Utah 1981). The trial court's conclusion could only be reached by ignoring the express
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terms of the Declaration. At the very least, a factual issue exists as to the meaning of the
terms, thus precluding the award of summary judgment.
Additionally, the court's Finding of Fact No. 12 completely misstates the
Plaintiffs' position. Plaintiffs have never argued that the Declaration prohibits Wendy's
from maintaining Menu-Board Signs. The fact is the Declaration expressly allows any
sign, including menu-board signs, so long as they are either: (1) attached to the interior
or exterior of Wendy's building, or (2) Wendy's receives written permission from the
other Owners and ASPI to install additional free standing signs. R. at 39, 40. It was
Wendy's who chose not to either install its menu-board signs on the exterior of its
building or seek permission from the other owners to install free standing menu-board
signs. Accordingly, the trial court's determination on this point was in error.
The trial court also accepted Wendy's invitation to construe the Declaration,
contrary to its express terms, to allow its signs because they are "essential to the
operation of drive-thru restaurants." (See R. at 255, f 6.) This request is contrary to Utah
law. Utah courts will not construe a contract to include a provision or covenant which is
contrary to the contract's express terms.
In the case of Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 104 P.3d
1226, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a plaintiffs argument that the well-established
covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be applied to a contract in a manner that
was inconsistent with express contractual terms. The trial court's award of summary
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judgment violates this principle. Here, to imply that a provision in the Declaration
allowing a drive-through restaurant on Parcel Three somehow trumps the express
contractual provision relating to signs on Parcel Three is contrary to this long-established
principle of Utah law. In Dalton v. Jerico Construction Company, the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
Even if the terms of the contract entered into in 1971 between
Healy and Jerico may not have been profitable to Dalton
when they were incorporated into the Dalton-Jerico contract
in 1973, it is not for a court to rewrite a contract
improvidently entered into at arm's length or to change the
bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed equitable
principles.
642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982)
The Court reached a similar result in Biesinger v. Behunin, wherein it stated:
Persons dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on
their own terms, without the intervention of the Courts for the
purpose of relieving one side or the other from the affects of a
bad bargain. Id. p. 803.
584 P.2d 801, 803 (Utah 1978).
At the time the Declaration was signed, the Declarants expressly agreed to the number of
signs that would be allowed on Parcel Three without the written permission of the other
owners and ASPI. Such express language is not subject to interpretation. In short, two
signs means two signs, not three, four or any other number needed for the convenience or
profitability of Wendy's business.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS' TRESPASS AND BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS
WERE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The trial court in this case determined that both Plaintiffs' trespass and breach of

contract claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. On the trespass
claims, the court's decision improperly characterizes the nature of the trespass. On the
breach of contract claims, the court's decision ignores undisputed facts that clearly show
acts undertaken within the statute of limitation period by Wendy's in violation of the
Declaration.
A.

Plaintiffs5 Trespass Claims are not Barred by the Statute of
Limitations.

The court in this case concluded that "the alleged trespass is permanent and has
been so since 1982," and therefore, Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the three year statute
of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1). In reaching this determination,
the court determined that the trespass at issue is a "permanent" trespass, as opposed to a
"continuing" trespass as referenced in the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in
Breiggar Properties, L. C. v. H. E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53 52 P.3d 1133.. The
trial court's determination on this point is contrary to the policy and rationale underlying
the Breiggar decision.
In Breiggar, the defendant, in the course of a road construction project, had
mistakenly dumped a load of waste material, including soil and rocks, on the plaintiff's
property. The plaintiff discovered the trespass some months after the actual act had
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occurred. There is no indication in Breiggar that defendant or defendant's agents or
invitees continued to use the property or that there was an ongoing deposit of material on
the plaintiffs property after a date certain. Instead, it appears that waste material was
dumped on plaintiffs property and defendants thereafter did not enter plaintiffs
property.
Upon discovering the trespass, the plaintiff demanded that defendant remove the
material and negotiations ensued. However, for some unexplained reason, plaintiff did
not file its action until some months after the three year statute of limitation had passed.
In its opinion, the Utah Supreme Court carefully explained the distinction between
a permanent and a continuing trespass. The Court noted:
We characterize a trespass as "permanent" to acknowledge
that the act or acts of trespass have ceased to occur. We
characterize a trespass as "continuing" to acknowledge that
multiple acts of trespass have occurred, and continue to
occur, and that, in the event the statute of limitations has run
on prior acts of trespass, recovery will only be allowed for
those acts which are litigated in a timely fashion.
By classifying acts of trespass in this manner, we give full
effect to the intent of the Utah Legislature in adopting a three
year statute of limitations for trespass.
To hold otherwise by, for example, adopting a reasonable
abatability test as advocated by Breiggar, would allow a
plaintiff to bring a complaint against any trespasser - even if
the act of trespass occurred decades earlier - as long as the
harm caused by the trespass could be reasonably abated. Such
a view would clearly undermine the purposes behind statutes
of limitations.
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Breiggar, 2002 UT 53, f 11, 13, 52 P.3d 1133. As noted in the memoranda submitted in
the trial court, after Wendy's purchased the property in February, 2003, it tore down the
Burger King signs and installed its own signs including at least two additional signs, and
installed a new fence that encroaches on Plaintiffs' property, and planted shrubbery,
flowers and a tree on Plaintiffs' property. R. at 262, 287. Additionally, in contrast to the
situation in Breiggar, in this case employees and patrons of Wendy's continue to trespass
on Plaintiffs' property every day and continue to utilize the Plaintiffs' property for
Wendy's sole and exclusive purposes. Agents of Wendy's maintain the property and
patrons utilize the drive-up window, to the exclusion of the property from its common
area purpose, as established in the Declaration. This is in stark contrast to the one
isolated act which occurred in Breiggar.
Plaintiffs do not contest the trial court's finding that the improvements installed
by Burger King on the Plaintiffs' property are "more permanent" than those at issue in
Breiggar. However, the permanency of the trespass, under the rationale as set forth in
Breiggar is not dispositive of whether the trespass is "continuing" or "permanent."
Instead, it is the ongoing nature of the intrusion onto the Plaintiffs' property by Wendy's
that should characterize Wendy's acts of trespass. Focusing solely on the "permanence"
of the initial trespass is more in line with the adoption of a "reasonable abatability" test
which was explicitly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. In this case, the trespass is
obviously continuing rather than permanent.
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It should also be noted that contrary to the actions of the Plaintiff in Breiggar, in
this case the construction of a new sign, a new fence and landscaping was not unknowing
and inadvertent, but was done with specific knowledge that Wendy's was, in fact,
trespassing. Additionally, Plaintiffs in this case did not wait beyond the three year statute
of limitations to file their action, but filed almost immediately after Wendy's trespassed
on Plaintiffs' property. Given the obvious distinctions between Breiggar and the case at
issue, the trial court's determination that the trespass in this case was permanent as
opposed to continuing was clearly wrong.
However, even if this Court were to accept that the original construction of DriveThrough Facilities on the property was a point in time from which the trespass claim
should be measured, construction of the new fence, the installation of additional
landscaping, and the placement of a Wendy's sign on Plaintiffs' property clearly
constitutes an additional act of trespass. The trial court's complete disregard of this point
is flatly wrong and, in and of itself, warrants reversal of the summary judgment.
B.

Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract Claims are not Barred by the Statute of
Limitations.

A similar analysis is applicable to the statute of limitations determination on the
breach of contract claims. Clearly, the additional actions of Wendy's, in replacing one
free standing menu board, installing an additional free standing menu board sign and
installing a sign and fencing on Plaintiffs' property constitute new acts in breach of the
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Declaration. Therefore, the Court's determination on the statute of limitations question as
applied to the breach of contract claims is also incorrect as a matter of law.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S INJUNCTIVE ORDER IS INCONSISTENT WITH
THE DECISION ON THE TRESPASS CLAIMS AND IS IN ERROR.
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in this matter, the court

concluded:
Wendy's is further entitled to an Order enjoining Plaintiffs
from taking any action to inhibit Wendy's from using and
maintaining the drive through facilities and menu-board signs
in their present location and configuration.
R. at 381. In the Final Order, the court ordered:
Plaintiffs are hereby enjoined from taking any action to
inhibit Defendant from using and maintaining the drive
through facilities and menu-board signs in their present
location and configuration.
R. at 385.
The trial court made the conclusion noted above and ordered as it did despite the
fact that it had earlier determined that the location of the Drive-Through Facilities
constituted a "permanent trespass." R. at 379, f 4. In essence, the court determined that
the Drive-Through Facilities constituted a trespass, but the Plaintiffs were barred from
requiring Defendants to remove the trespass by the applicable statute of limitations.
However, the court then determined that the Declaration specifically allowed the DriveThrough Facilities and the signs which Wendy's constructed. Plaintiffs assert that an act
of trespass cannot be "authorized" by the Declaration. The trial court's determinations
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are internally inconsistent and require reversal of the summary judgment granted in this
case. Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 290 P.2d 689, 690-691, (Utah 1955) ("if, on
the same evidence, the trial court should make findings of fact necessarily contrary to
each other, such action would be capricious and that such inconsistent findings should
not be permitted to stand.5')
The court's Order in this case enjoining the Plaintiffs from taking any action to
inhibit Wendy's use of the Drive-Through Facilities was legally incorrect. As noted in
Point Heading I, above, it is apparent that the court's construction of the Declaration was
incorrect as a matter of law. Therefore, the Declaration does not authorize the continued
maintenance and use of the improvements. As shown below, the trial court's decision on
the statute of limitations question also fails to legitimize Wendy's use of Plaintiffs'
property.
While Plaintiffs may not be able to require Wendy's to remove the offending
structures and improvements, nothing in the litigation has established a permanent right
for Wendy's (or its predecessors) to maintain the improvements perpetually. Assuming
for purposes of argument that the trial court's decision on the statute of limitations
question was correct, Plaintiffs should still have every legal right, at their own expense,
to remove the encroaching facilities and to restore the property to its appropriate and
designated common area use.

26

Wendy's has not acquired a prescriptive easement over the property. That element
of its counterclaim appears to have been abandoned in the court below. However, if the
trial court's decision is upheld, the sole and exclusive use of Plaintiffs' property will have
vested in the Defendant. Wendy's abandonment of its prescriptive easement claim is
instructive on this point. In Nyman v. Anchor Dev. LLC,

2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357, the

Utah Supreme Court stated:
Here the term "use" implies an inherent distinction in the
property rights conferred by an easement, on the one hand,
and outright ownership, on the other. "A prescriptive
easement does not result in ownership, but allows only use of
property belonging to another for a limited purpose."
Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 667, 681 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) affd 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990). Thus, we have
previously observed that: whenever there is ownership of
property subject to an easement, there is a dichotomy of
interest, both of which must be respected and kept in balance.
On the one hand, it is to be realized that the owner of the fee
title, because of his general ownership, should have the use
and enjoyment of his property to the highest degree possible,
not inconsistent with the easement. On the other, the owner of
the easement should likewise have the right to use and enjoy
his easement to the fullest extent possible not inconsistent
with the rights of the fee owner. N Union Canal Co. v.
Newell, 550 P.2d 178. 179 (Utah 1976). Maintaining such a
balance between the rights of the fee title owner and a
purported easement holder becomes impossible when the
latter asserts a right to permanent, exclusive occupancy of the
fee owner's land. We conclude that the right to keep a garage
on another's property falls outside the scope of a prescriptive
easement, and therefore, the latter is simply unavailable to
Nyman as an alternative in this case. Indeed we know of no
prior Utah case recognizing a prescriptive easement right to
maintain a permanent structure on someone else's property."
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Nyman, 2003 UT 27, f 18. (emphasis added). It would appear that Wendy's abandoned
its prescriptive easement claim because the law clearly does not support it. However, the
trial court's decision has the same effect as the grant of a prescriptive easement. The trial
court's decision grants to Wendy's a right to "permanent, exclusive occupancy" of
Plaintiffs' property. If that right is unavailable through a prescriptive easement analysis,
it certainly should not vest through application of the statute of limitations to a trespass
claim. See also Plant v. Johnson, 185 S.W. 2d 711 (Ark. 1945) (holding that a failure to
file on tax claim within the statute of limitation period could not result in the forfeiture of
ownership of property). Assuming the trial court's decision on the statutes of limitation
was correct, while damages may not be available to the Plaintiffs, they can certainly
reclaim their property. Therefore, the court's Order is obviously contrary to the purpose
and intent of Utah law.
V.

THE COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES WAS IN ERROR.
In Utah, an award of attorneys' fees must be either based on statutory authority or

a contract. Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2002 UT App 406, f 13, 60 P.2d
1776. When an award is based on contract, the terms and provisions of the contract
calling for attorneys' fees are controlling. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108
(Utah 1991). In this case, the Declaration establishes the contractual right to attorneys'
fees and provides as follows:
(i) Attorneys' Fees. In the event the legal proceedings are
brought or commenced to enforce any of the terms of this
28

Declaration against any owner or other party with an
interest in the Shopping Center, the successful party in
such action shall then be entitled to receive and shall
receive from the defaulting owner or party a reasonable
sum as attorneys' fees and costs to be fixed by the court
in the same action.
R. at 47. While the Declaration establishes a right to recover attorneys' fees for a
successful party in litigation, such fees must be recovered from a defaulting owner or
party. The conduct of the Plaintiffs in this case is not at issue. There has been no
allegation or finding that Plaintiffs have been or are in default of any of their obligations
under the Declaration. Accordingly, the court's award of attorneys' fees in this matter
was in error.
In addition to the foregoing, Utah law clearly provides that a party seeking
attorneys' fees has a duty to allocate the fees it is requesting among the separate causes
of action or claims pursued in the litigation. Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d
470 (Utah App 1999). In this case, the Court made no effort to require the Defendants to
provide a proper allocation between the separate causes of action. This is especially
troubling in this case where the Court's initial decision specified only a statute of
limitations bar, but after the Defendant's submission of proposed Findings and
Conclusions, was extended to cover issues under the terms of Declaration also.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is apparent that there were significant, material fact
disputes regarding critical facts at issue in this litigation. However, notwithstanding such
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factual disputes, the court awarded summary judgment to the Defendants, dismissing
Plaintiffs' claims and awarding judgment to Wendy's on its Counterclaim. In essence,
the court's decision has taken Plaintiffs' property, properly characterized under the
Declaration as "common area" for the use and benefit of the owners and parties to the
Declaration, and has vested the sole and exclusive use of that property in Wendy's.
Plaintiffs have no access to or ability to use the property in the manner contemplated by
the Declaration. This is clearly in violation of specific terms of the contract between the
parties, producing an unjust result.
Wendy's entered on the Plaintiffs' property and constructed improvements with
full knowledge that it was trespassing and that there was an objection to its actions.
Wendy's has constructed free standing signs in violation of the express terms of the
Declaration. The decision of the trial court in this matter should be overturned and the
case remanded for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J™1

day of August, 2006.

MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C.
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and correct copy of the foregoing by mailing, postage prepaid, first-class United States
mail, to the following:
Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
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THIS DECLARATION OP RESTRICTIONS AND GRANT OP EASEMENTS
Is made as of the

of M.y, 1982, by and between THE

BQYER COMPANY, a Otah General Partnership ("Boyer"), WHITE
INVESTMENT/ INC., a Otah corporation/ PAPAHIKOLAS BROTHERS
ENTERPRISES, a general partnership and MELVILLE LTD.. a Utah
limited partnership (collectively, "White"), all c # wfcom are
collectively referred to herein as

the "Declarants"•

R E C I T A L S
(A)

WHEREAS, White is or will be at the time of this

documents recordation, the owner of that certain real property
located in the County of Salt Lake, State o£ Utah, designated
and shown as Parcels One and Two (hereinafter "Parcel One" and
•Parcel Two", respectively) on the site plan attached-hereto as
Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference (the "Plot
Plan"); and
(B)

WHEREAS, Boyer is or will be at the tine of this

document's recordation, the owner of that certain real property
located in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, designated
and shown as Parcel Three on the Plot Plan ("Parcel Three"); and
(C)

WHEREAS, American Stores Properties, Inc., a

Delaware corporation ("ASP1") is or will be at the time of this
trt
document's recordation, the tenant under a lonq term ground
lease on that certain real property located in the County of

&

•O

Salt Lake, State of Utah, designated and shown as Parcel One,

CD
on the Plut IIan; and

(D) WHE'AEAS, the legal descriptions of Parcels One,
5Vo# and Three ar'i set forth on Exhibit "B" attached hereto and
incorporated herein by re£ecence# all of which are referred to
herein as the "Shopping Center"!
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, and
the covenants and agreements set forth herein. Declarants agree
as follows;
X#

INCORPORATION,

Recitals (A) through (D) ace incorporated herein and
made a part hereof,
II.

DEFINITIONS,

The following terns shall have the meaning specified
belov*
*•

9XSSL9

Ihe

trrw "Owner* or "Owners* means the

Owner of Parcel One, Owner of Parcel Two. and the Owner of
Parcel JThree*
B»

Owner of Parcel One,

The term "Owner of Parcel

Ohe^means White and its respective assigns, grantees and
successors in interest having fee record title to all or any
portion or Parcel One*
;:€•

:Owner of Parcel Two*

The term "Owner of Parcel

Tyio* means White and its respective assigns, grantees and
successors in interest having fee record title to all or any
portion of Parcel Two*
D,

Owner of Parcel Three,

The term "Owner of Parcel

Three" means Boyer and its respective assigns, grantees and

_,

w

sucessors in interest having fee record title for all or any

^

portion of Parcel Three;

g

E.

ASPI. The term "ASPI" means American Stores

Properties, Inc./ a Delaware corporation and its successors and
assigns- under a long term lease with White as landlord and ASPI

g
OD

as tenant on Parcel One, so long as such lease is in .Corce and
effect.
III.
A.

BUILDING AREA AND COMMON AREA.
Building Area. No building or other structure

shall be constructed on those portions of the Shopping Center
which are cross-hatched on the Plot Plan and labeled "Common
Area Only,'

The tern "Building Area* shall mean that area in

the Shopping Center upon which buildings and related structures
are constructed or are being constructed, and which is not
designated as Common Area Only.

Each owner hereby agrees with

respect tq its Parcel, that it will devote to use for retail
sales and financial or food services only chat port! m of the
Building Area on such Parcel which would comply with and be
allowable under applicable zoning regulations relating to
parking ratio requirements for such Parcel, taking into account
only the parking area of such Parcel*
B.

Common Area. The term "Common Area" as used

herein shall mean those areas of the Shopping Center which,
from time to time, are not Building Area. Comsion Area sha?l be
used only for vehicular access, circulation and parking,
pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the
Owners, tenants, customers, invitees, licensees, agents and
employees of the Owners and business occupants of the buildings
constructed in the Shopping Center, and for the servicing and
supplying of such businesses, except as otherwise provided
herein.

In addition, the Common Area may be used (i) in

connection with the construction, maintenance and repair of any
buildings and the common Area of the Shopping Center so long as
such use does not unreasonably restrict access to and from and
the conduct of business from the buildings in the Shopping
Center or access to and from the adjacent streets; (ii) in
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connection with the construction and maintenance of utility
lines, so long as such activity is undertaken after obtaining
the written permission of the Owners and ASPI; and (iii) for
any other use required by any governmental authority having
jurisdiction thereof.

No building, barricade or structure may

be placed, erected or constructed within the Common Area on any
paxcel except loading and delivery docks and covered areas
attached to such docks, trash enclosures, outride storage areas
(which docks, trash enclosures and storage areas shall not be
located in the front of any building within the Shopping
Center), pylon (to the extent not herein prohibited) and
directional signs, bumper guards or curbs, paving, landscaping
and landscape planters, lighting standards, driveways,
sidewalks, walkways, parking stalls, columns or pillars
supporting roof overhangs, and any other improvements as may be
required under applicable laws, rules, ordinances and
regulations of any governmental body having jurisdiction over
the Shopping Center.

There shall be no charge or other

validation for parking on the Common Area (unless required by
governmental regulations) without the prior written consent of
the Owners and AS PI.

The parking and vehicular traffic patterns

for the areas of the Shopping Center which are designated
"Common Area Only11 on the Plot Plan shall be designed,
installed and maintained as shown on the Plot Plan*

The

parking requirements of each Parcel shall be maintained in
accordance with applicable zoning regulations, as set forth in
Paragraph A immediately above.
C.

Construction of Common Areas. The Common Areas

on P&rcel Three as shown on the Plot Plan shall be constructed
by and at the sole expense of the Owner of Parcel Three by the
earlier of (i) a date prior to the completion of remodeling to

the building on building area A on Parcel Three as shown on the
Plot Plan or (ii) January 1, 1984•

The Common Areas on Parcels

One and Two shall be completed, respectively, at the expense of
the Owner of such parcel, upon the earlier of (i) completion of
any new buildings on such parcel, or (ii) the date on which any
building on such parcel i; open to the public foe business.
D.

Design and Construction of Buildings.

In no

6rent shall any building constructed in the Shopping Center
exceed one (1) story (excluding mezzanines) nor shall any
building (excepting the existing buildings as presently
constructed in the Shopping Center) exceed a height of
thirty-five (35) feet.

There shall be no party walls in the

Shopping Center, and even though a wall on the boundary of a
Parcel-oay~abut~a. wall on the boundary of another Parcel, they
shall not be deemed to be party walls, provided however, the
.easterly .portion of any building on Parcel Two may abut the
wall of any building on Parcel Three so long as the v$ll of
such building on Parcel Three is .not used as a load bearing
wall for the benefit of the building on Parcel Two.

The Owner

of Parcel Threa agrees to enter into a party wall agreement at
the request of the Owner of Parcel Two, the ter?s of which
shall be consistant with.the foregoing and consistent with the
terms of party wall agreements commonly used in shopping
centers similar to the Shopping Center.
IV.

EASEMENTS.

A.

Ingress, Egress and Parking? Access Drives, Each

Owner# as grantor with respect to each parcel owned by such
Owner, hereby grants to each of the other Owners, as grantees,
for the benefit of each of such other Owners and their
respective tenants, employees, agents, customers and invitee
of such tenants/ and for the benefit of each parcel owned by

S
$£
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each granteer a non-exclusive easement appurtenant to each
parcel, owned by each grantee for ingress and egress by
vehicular and pedestrian traffic and for vehicular parking
upon, over and across the Common Area within each parcel or
parcels owned by the grantor*

Such easements shall be for the

Common Area uses described in Article ZIZ Paragraph B above and
shall be subject to all restrictions Imposed on such uses by
this Declaration.
Each Owner of Parcel One, Parcel Two, and Parcel Three
as grantor with respect to each parcel owned by such owner,
hereby grants to each of the other Owners, as grantees, for the
benefit of each of such other Owners and their respective
tenants and invitees and for the benefit of each such parcel, a
ncn-erclusive easement to be used as access drives over and
across each such parcel for ingress and egress by vehicular and
pedestrian traffic from adjacent streets which access drives
are more particularly identified and shown on the Plot Plan as
the "Access Drives9. Such Owner further agrees not to use or
permit the use of the Access Drives in such manner as to
interfere with any other Owner's (or ASPI's) use thereof and
agrees that the Access Drives shall not be used for vehicular
parking.
B.

Building Encroachment.

Each Owner hereby grants

to the other Owners nn ease me tit to maintain footings,
foundations, eaves, walls, roof overhangs and other portions of
a building to the extent they encroach upon an adjoining Parcel
by no more than eighteen (18) inches, and each Owner agrees to
gr'inc easements for such purposes to the other Owners if the
encroachment is greater than eighteen (18).Inches on an
adjoining Parcel, if such encroachments are, in the reasonable
opinion of the grantor, of a minor or inconsequential nature.

The owner ao encroaching agrees not to interfere with an
existing structure on the servient Parcel.

The easement

granted in this paragraph shall survive this Declaration and
ahall last so long as the building of which such encroachments
are a part is standing•

The exercise by one Owner of the

fights herein granted shall be at no cost to the othet Owner
unless agreed to in writing by the other Owner and shall be
performed so as no interfere as little as possible with the
other Owner's use and enjoyment of its Parcel; and, if the
surface of either owner9s parcel and/or any improvements
thereon shall be disturbed by an Owner1* exercise of the rights
herein granted, such surface and/or improvements shall be
promptly restored by such Owner, at such Cvner's sole cost and
expense, to its condition just prior to such disturbance«
With respect to each overlapping encroachment
easement, the first Owner to construct any building or other
improvement within such encroachment easement atea (including
existing buildings or improvements) shall be entitled to
maintain such building and improvements -tnd Shall not be
required to remove or alter the same to enable She other Owner
to build in the same encroachment easement area.
V.

WtHTBWAKCg.

Each Owner, at its own expense, shall maintain the
area designated as Common Area Only on the plot Plan and
located on its parcel at all times in good and clean condition
and repair, which maintenance shall include, but not be limited
to the following:
(a)

Maintaining the paved surfaces in a level,

smooth and evenly covered condition with the type of
surfacing material originally instilled or such

s u b s t i t u t e an s h a l l in a l l respects be equal or
superior in q u a l i t y , use and durability;
(b)

Removing a l l papers, debris, f i l t h ,

refuse,

snow, i c e and water and thoroughly sweeping the area
t o the extent reasonably necessary to keep the araa in
*- clean and orderly condition?
(c)

P l i c i n g , keeping in repair, and replacing

any necessary appropriate directional signs* markers
and l i n e s ;
""$&:.> Q£*?£fc*?5ft k? e P* n 9; in repair* and replacing*
where nece»^a^^, stjch . a r t i f i c i a l lighting f a c i l i t i e s
es^sha^bcj^reisonAbly required* e l l of which s h a l l be
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in writing,, upoir the Owner
.•*•'."

'-^3ls»C '• so • i e ^ e r f ^ ^ and'agreeing in writing to pay
3i^;eh&
whli^K^atfts ^hail^ includtey but not be Ifmited t o , the
coat. . j g J f ^ ^ t r i ^ i ^ aainten^nce and' bulbs j provided^
bowe^^rviltliiajt^hr Owner of t h e \ f a r c e l # a s towhicfi
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additional lighting is requested shall have the right
to disapprove a request for additional lighting if
such Owner determines that the proration and
reimbursement of costs and expenses would be
unreasonably cumbersome or burdehsome.
VI • RESTRICTIONS.
A.

Shopping Center Business. The Shopping Center

and all parts thereof may be used only for the construction,
operation and maintenance of mercantile, business, financial,
food retailing and professional establishments and related
facilities, including vehicular driveway and parking areas as
more particularly described herein.
No part of the Shopping Center shall be devoted to use
for selling, renting, leasing or displaying for the purposes of
selling, renting or leasing any motor vehicle, boat or trailer,
movie theaters, adult bookstores, bowling alleys, skating
rinks, or bars or taverns (except in restaurants). No building
featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through* traffic shall be
located on Parcel Three, except as shown on the Plot Plan,
without the prior written consent of the Owner of Parcel TWO
and ASPI, including consent to the location of the drive-in,
drive-up or drive-through lanes of such facility.

Such consent

will not be unreasonably withheld provided that .the location of
such lanes and the use thereof do not impede or inhibit access
to and from and t.1e conduct of business from the buildings in

«*,

the shopping Center or access to and from the adjacent streets.

ot

B.

Parking Restrictions.

No persons, other than

Owners, tenants and occupants of the Shopping Center, and Hicir
customers, employees and invitees, shall be permitted to park
in the Common Area, unless all owners and ASPI give their prior
written approval.
-9-
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C.

Employee Parking*

Specific areas within the

Common Area of the Shopping Center to be used for motor vehicle
parking purposes by employees of occupants of the Shopping
Center may be designated from time to time by the unanimous
written consent of the Owners and ASPI.

In the event employee

parking areas are designated as provided herein, employees of
any Owner, tenant or other occupant of any building in the
Shopping Center shall use only those portions of the Common
Area designated for such employee motor vehicle parking
purposes.

The authority herein granted shall be exercised in

such manner as not to discriminate against any Owner, ASPI or
commercial establishment in the Shopping Center.
VII.

SIGNS.

Each Owner shall have the right to maintain such signs
on the interior - f buildings located on its parcel as it
desires, whether or not such signs are visible from the
exterior.

As permitted by local ordinances and other applicable

governmental regulations, each Owner shall have the right to
erect, maintain and replace signs on the exterior of buildings
located on its parcel; provided, in no event shall signs be
located on the roofs (excluding canopies so long as no sign is
erected on a canopy which sign will extend above the height of
the building roof) of any buildings in the Shopping Center
without the prior written consent of all Owners and ASPI.
The Owners of Parcels One and Two shall have the right
to construct from time to time any sign or signs it deems

§

advisable on its parcels*

ft
o

The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to
construct two (2) free-standing pylon, monument or other signs
at the location designated on the Plot Plan as "Parcel Three

j§
&>

Sign."

No other pylon/ monument or other free-standing sign

shall be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written
approval of all Owners and ASPI.
VIII.
*•

INDEMNIFICATION.
Indemnification of Owners.

Each Owner agrees to

indemnify, hold harmless and defend all other Owners from all
claims, actions, liabilities, damages, expenses and judgments,
including but not limited to attorneys9 fees, reasonable
investigative and discovery costs, court costs and all other
sums on account of any injury to persons, loss of life or

damage to property

occurring

on any parcel

owned by each such

indemnifying Owner (including within any building located
thereon) and on the streets and sidewalks adjacent thereto or
- arising from or connected with the use, non-use, condition or
- occupation - of* such-parcel,- streets or- sidewalks,-which- are..not
caused, in whole or in part, by the active or passive
negligence of the Owner (or its agents, contractors or
employees) claiming such indemnification.
B.

Waiver of Certain Rights.

Bach Owner hereby

waives any rights it may have against another Owner on account
of any loas or damage occasioned to each Owner, as t*>e case may
"be, their respective parcels tiwclxnliTTg *"*ui-Mit*g* and -cont-ents
of buildings thereon), or to other portions of the Shopping
Center, arising from any risk generally covered by fire and
extended coverage insurance whether or not such an insurance
policy is maintained or there are insurance proceeds sufficient
to cover the loss.

Each Owner hereby waives: any right of

subrogation that it may have against the other Owners in
connection with any risk or claim covered by such fire and
extended coverage insurance and shall procure from its insurers

under all policies of fire and extended coverage insurance a
waiver of all rights of subrogation which the insurers might
otherwise have under such policies.
IX.

LIABILITY INSURANCE

A.

General Coverage and Limits.

Each Owner agrees

to maintain or cause to be maintained liability insurance
against claims for bodily injury, death and property damage
occurring onf in or about its parcel (including within the
buildings thereon) and the streets and sidewalks adjacent to
its parcel, with limits for one occurrence of not less than a
"Combined Single Limit:" (covering bodily injury* death and
property damage liability) of not less than One Million Doll»n
($1,000,000).

Such insurance may be in the form of blanket

liability coverage applicable to the Owner's parcel and other
property owned or occupied by the Owner or the party carrying
such insurance coverage for the benefit of such Owner.

So long

as any Owner or party carrying such insurance coverage (or the
responsible parent, subsidiary or affiliated companies of such
Owner or party) shall have a net worth of more than Fifty
Million Dollars ($50,000,000), such Owner or party may insure,
in whole or in part, under any plan of self-insurance which
such Owner or party (or the parent, subsidiary or affiliated
companies of such Owner or party) may, from time to time, have
in force and effect.

Such Owner or party shall, upon request,

provide the other Owners with evidence of such coverage and a
description of any plan of self-insurance being used.

•2
B.

Performance of Indemnity Agreements.

All

policies of insurance required under this article shall insure
the performance of the Owner insured thereunder of the
indemnity agreements contained in Article VIII and shall

Q
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contain a provision that the insurance company will give twenty
(20) days advance written notice to the Owners and ASPI of any
cancellation or lapse, or the effective date of any reduction
in the amounts or scope of coverage*

Each Owner shall deliver

to the other Owners a*id ASPI upon demand a certificate from the
applicable insurer that such insurance required in this Article
is in full force and effect and. that such insurance insures the
performance by the Owner insured of the indemnity agreements to
limits not less than those specified in this Article.

Each

Owner shall .promptly notify the other Owner(s) of any asserted
claim with respect to which such Owner is or may be indemnified
against hereunder and shall deliver to such Owner(s) copies of
process and pleadings.
X.

DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION,

In the event any building in the Shopping Center is
damaged or destroyed by any cause whatsoever, the Owner of the
parcel upon which such building is located will either (i)
cause the commencement of reconstruction to the damaged or
destroyed building within ninety (90) days after such damage
and destruction and will thereafter cause such reconstruction
to be diligently prosecuted to completion; or (ii) within
ninety (90) days of the date of damage or destruction, commence
the removal of such damaged building and thereafter diligently
prosecute to completion the removal of the damaged building,
the removal of all debris from the building pad and the
leveling and dust sealing of such building pad.

In the event

the Common Area of the Shopping Center or any portion thereof
shall be damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty or any
other cause whatsoever, the Owner of the Common Area so damaged
or destroyed shall i

**hwith proceed with due diligence to

restore such Common Area to a condition to permit free and safe
vehicular and pedes' ian access and circulation and vehicular
parking in the Shopping Center from and to all adjacent
streets, in the manner required by this Declaration.
XI.

TAXES.

Each Owner shall pay or cause to be paid directly to
the tax collector prior to delinquency, all real property taxes
and other special taxes and assessments assessed against the
parcel owned by such Owner, subject to the right of any Owner
and AS PI to contest such taxes and assessments in the manner
provided by law*
XII.
A*

GENERAL - PROVIS IONS.
Covenants Run With The Land.

Each easement,

restriction and covenant over each parcel ot parcels In the
Shopping Center shall be appurtenant to and for the benefit of
each other parcel in the Shopping Center and each part
thereof*

Each covenant, restriction and undertaking as to each

parcel in the Shopping Center shall be a burden thereon for the
benefit of each other parcel and each part thereof, and shall
run with the land.

Such covenants shall be prior and superior

to all mortgages, deeds of trust and other liens now or
hereafter executed on each parcel or parcels in the Shopping
Center.
B.

Inurement.

This Declaration and the easements,

covenants, restrictions, benefits %nd obligations created
hereby shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon each
Owner and its successors and assigns; provided, if any Owner
conveys any portion or all of its interest in any parcel owned
by it, such Owner shall thereupon be released and discharged
from any and all further obligations under this Declaration as

it had in connection with the property conveyed by it if the
buyer assumes in writing all of such obligations, and provided
further, that no such sale shall release such Owner from any
liabilities, actual or contingent, existing as of the time of
such conveyance.
C.

Duration.

Except as otherwise provided herein,

this Declaration shall remain in full force and effect for a
term of the longer of sixty (60) years from the date hereof, o«.
the date the Ground Lease as defined below is terminated.
Notwithstanding the above, in the event that certain
ground lease on Parcel One between White as landlord and ASPI
as tenant, of even date herewith, (the "Ground Lease") is
terminated by virtue of the failure to comply with certain
conditions precedent therein, this Declaration shall also
terminate, except with respect to certain rights and
obligations as set forth below, upon the giving by White of
written notice thereof to Boyer, which notice shall be in the
form of an affidavit of White stating that the* Ground Lease has
terminated, which affidavit shall be recorded in the Office of'
the County Recorder, Salt Lake County, Utah; provided, however,
if no such notice has been given to Boyer by ;uly 1, 1984, this
Declaration shall continue in force and effect for the duration
set forth in tJie paragraph immediately above*
In the event of an early termination of this
Declaration as more particularly described in the paragraph
immediately above, such termination shall not act as a
termination of nor affect the existence, validity or
enforceability of (i) the covenant of the Owner of Parcel Two
not to construct any building or other structure on the
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Non-Terminable Property* (ii) the easement granted across the
Non-Terminable Property and the easement granted across Parcel
Three for purposes of unimpeded ingress and egress to and from
3300 South Street, and the maintenance thereof, (iii) the
rights of the Owners to enforce such covenants and rights to
such easements.

Furthermore, at such time as all or a portion

of Parcels One or Two is developed commercially, the owner
thereof shall cause improved parking to be constructed and
maintained in accordance with then existing governmental
requirements.

Such covenants and easements set forth above

shall run with the land and shall inure to the benefit of and
be binding upon each Owner and its successors and assigns for a
period of time ending sixty (60) years from the date hereof*
The term "Non-Terminable Property" as used herein is that
property outlined on the Plot Plan #as such, and more
'particularly described on Exhibit "C"' attached hereto and *
Incorporated herein by reference.
In the event an early termination of the Declaration
occurs, as described above, and the Owner of Parcel One and/or
the Owner of Parcel Two subsequently develops such Parcel or
Parcels for purposes of a commercial development, such Owner or
Owners shall negotiate in good faith with the Owner of Parcel
Three in order to reach an agreement which will grant
reasonable easements across Parcels One, Two 'and Three and
related covenants in order to create an integrated shopping
center.
D.

Injunctive Relief.

In the event of any violation

or threatened violation of any provision in this Declaration by
any Owner, lessee, or occupant of any portion of the Shopping
Center, any or all of the Owners and ASPI shall have the right,
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in addition to the other remedies herein provided, to enjoin
such violation or threatened violation*
B.

Right to Cure*

Should any Owner fail to timely

perforin any of its obligations hereunder and thereafter fail to
cure such failure within fifteen (15) days of its receipt of
any other Owner's or ASPI's written demand therefor/ the Owner
or ASPI giving such notice shall, in addition to any other
remedy provided at law or in this Declaration,' have the right
(but not the obligation) to perform such obligation on behalf
of the defaulting Owner and the defaulting Owner shall
reimburse the curing Owner or ASPI, as the case may be, for the
cost of performing such work within fifteen (15) days after
rece±pt-of-billing-therefor-and^roof -of -payment*thereof. -In
the event the defaulting Owner does not reimburse the curing
Owner -or ASPI, as the case may be, within such fifteen (15) day
period, such amount shall bear interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum or the highest legal rate, whichever is
lower, as of the date of billing until paid.

The curing Owner,

or ASPI, 4S the case may be, shall have the right to exercise
any and all rights which such curing Owner or ASPI might have
•at law to collect the same.
P.

Modification.

This Declaration may not be

modified in any respect whatsoever or rescinded, in whole or in
part, except with the written consent of the Owners and ASPI*
Any modification or rescission of this Declaration may be made
only by written instrument duly executed and acknowledged by
the appropriate Owners and ASPI.
G„

-Not -a Public -Dedication.

Nothing -herein

contained shall be deemed to be * gift or dedication of any
portion of tho Shopping Center to the general public or for any
public purposes whatsoever, it being the intention of the
-17-

Declarants that this Declaration shall be strictly limited to
and for the purposes herein expressed.
H.

Breach Shall Not Permit Termination,

No breach

of this Declaration shall entitle any Owner to cancel# rescind
or otherwise terminate this Declaration, but such limitations
shall not affect in any manner, any other rights or remedies
which such Owner or ASPI may have hereunder by reason of any
breach of this Declaration.
I.#

Attorneys* Fees.

In the event that legal

proceedings are brought or commenced to enforce any of the
terms of this Declaration against any Owner Or other party with
an interest in the Shopping Center, the successful party in
such action shall then be entitled to receive and shall receive
from the defaulting Owner or party.a reasonable sum as
attorneys1 fees and costs, to be fixed by the court in the same
action.
XIII.
A.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

Owner's Right to Award.

Nothing herein shall be

construed to give an Owner any interest in any award or payment
made to any other Owner in connection with any exercise of
eminent domain or transfer in lieu thereof affecting any other
Owner's parcel or giving the public or any government any
rights in the parcels.

In the event of any exercise of eminent

domain or transfer in lieu thereof of any.part of the Common
Area located within the Shopping Center, the award attributable
to the land and improvements of such portion of the Common Area
shall be payable only to its Owner# and no claim thereon shall
be made by any other Owner.
B.

Collateral Claims.

All other Owners or persons

having an Interest in the Common Area so condemned may file
collateral claims with the condemning authority for their
-18-

losses which are separate and apart from the value of the land
area and improvements taken.
C.

Tenant's Claim*

Nothing in this article shall

prevent a tenant in the Shopping Center from making a claim
against an Owner pursuant to the provisions of any lease
between the tenant and Owner for all or a portion of any such
award or payment.
D.

Restoration of Common Area.

The Owner'of each

portion of the Common Area so condemned shall promptly repair
and restore the remaining portion of the Common Area so owned
as near as practicable to its condition immediately prior to
such condemnation or transfer to the extent that the proceeds
of such award are sufficient to pay the cost of such
restoration and repair and without contribution from any other
Owner; provided, the Common Area shall be restored to a
condition which permits the uses thereof which are contemplated
herein.
E.

Restoration of Building Area.

In the event any

building located in the Shopping Center is partially condemned,
the remaining portion of the building, if it is not restored,
shall be demolished by the Owner of the parcel on which it is
located and such Owner shall remove all debris resulting
therefrom, and thereafter maintain such parcel in a smooth
level condition, free and clear of all refuse and sealed
against dust and shall restore the Common Area surrounding such
building to the condition required by this Declaration.
XIV.

NOTICES.

Any notice or demand given or served by one Owner to
another or ASPI shall not be deemed to have been duly given or
served unless in writing and forwarded by certified or
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Consent
ASPI hereby consents to the, foregoing Declaration of
Restrictions and Grant of Easements as of the date first above
written.
AMERICAS STORES PROPERTIES, IHC, ,
a Delaware corporation
^

By

President

Seocetary
*7 r

''-.mHiM*"'

-22-

L

fc£3

.rr^on Area
Only

Access Driv

Approved:
Landlord:
Tenant t
»**» Ji

**< t~*

«

la
V
"\

»r^y«

>»4

S5XT
;,<.^.

-i

EXHIBIT "B"
Set forth the legal descriptions of Parcel One, Two 4 Threei
Parcel One;
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 65 Canyon Rim
Addition as Amended and Extended according to the official
plat thereof, said point being North 0* 03• 15* West
1136*358 feet to a county survey monument and South 89* 58•
45" East along the 3300 South Street monument line 330.10
feet and North 0* 03» 15* West 50-00 feet from the South
quarter corner of Section 26, Township 1 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence North
0 # 03' 15* West 340.71 feet? thence North 36* 28f 14* West
17,01 feet? thence North 0* 03' 15" West 532.57 feet? thence
South 89p 56f 45" East 588.77 feet to the Northeast corner
of Lot 64 of said Canyon Rim Addition Amended and Extended
Subdivision? thence South 0° 021 10" East 112.00 feet?
thence North 89# 56' 45" West 93.41-feet; thence South 0*
03' 15" West 205.00 feet? thence North 89" 56• 45* West
21.74 feet? thence South 0" 03• 15* West 229.05 feet; thence
North 89° 58' 10" West 131.826 feet? thence South 0* 02f 10*
East 140.654 feet; thence North 89° 58' 45* West 330.80 feet
to the point of beginning. * Contains 322,294.0 square feet
or 7.399 acres.
Parcel Two:
Beginning South 89* 58• 10" East 165.20 feet from the
Southeast corner of Lot 64, Canyon Rim Addition as Amended
and Extended according to the official plat thereof, said
point of beginning also being North 0° 03' 15" West 1136.358
feet to a county survey monument and South 89* 58' 45* East
along the 3300 South Street monument line 1073.74 feet and'
North 0° 02' 10" West 190.59 feet from the South quarter
corner of Section 26, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt
Lake Base and Heridian and running thence North 8*9* 584 10*"
West 281.03 feet? thence north 0° 03' 15" East 229.05 feet?
thence South 89* 56• 45" East 21.74 feet? thence North 0*
03f 15" East 205.00 feet? thence South 89* 56* 45" East
134.37 feet to the Southeasterly line of Metro Way (k 66
foot right of v/ay) ? thence North 58 • 39' East along said
Southeasterly line 75.19 feet? thence South 0° 02« 10" East
473.11 feet to the point of beginning. Contains 13 8,617.0
square feet or 2.723 acres.
Parcel Threet
Beginning at a point North 0° 02' 26" West 1136.358
feet? South 89" 58' 45" East 980.366 feet? North 0°'02,*10"
West 50.0 feet from the South Quarter Corner of Section 26,
Township 1 South Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
said point being on the North line of 3300 South Street;
thence -South. 8 9 •-581. 45". -East..307c- -teet.Jto-.the.lZest.Aine.jof
Valley Street, thence North along the West line of Valley
Street North 0° 02' 10" West 636.394 feet, thence North 89»
56* 45* West 94.25 feet to a pc .nt on the South line of
Metro Way; thence along said South line South 58* 39• East
141.104 feet, thence South 0" 02* 10" West 472.3*t feet,
thence North 89" 58• 10" West 92.275 feet, thence .South 0 #
04f East 140.592 feet to the point of beginning.
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EXHIBIT "C"
Set forth the legal description of
the Non-Terminable Property
Beginning at a point which is North Q* 02 • 26" West
1136.358 feet to a county survey ihonuinent, South 89" 58f 45"
East along the 3300 South Street monument line 1072.566
feetr and North 0° 02• 10" West 190.576 feet from the South
quarter corner of Section 26, Township 1 South, Kange 1
Bast, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 0 # 02• 10"
West 111.54 feet; thence North 89" 581 10" West 190.00 feet;
thence South 0" 02• 10" East 111.54 feet? thence South 89##
58' 10" East 190.00 feet to the point of beginning.
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r e s p e c t i v e l y , of AMERICAN STORES PROPERTIES, I N C . , a Delaware
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and
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and

is ft general partner of the Boyer Company and that h i s
execution of the foregoing agreement is in his capacity a s
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and o n behalf of the Boyer Company as a general partner
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STATE OF UTAH
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE*
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6.0. /D^Vrufi,/

,'a notary public in

and for said county and state, certify that on the«2£)7*"day of
,1982,

personally appeared before me

J^^+^JAA., &/*C
say, that he, *Jol\{\

who being by me duly sworn did
r&fifcrtrt &/*~S
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\ *« the

, of PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS

ENTERPRISES, a general partnership, and that the within, and
foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of such partnership
and ^Mn TJJ&ZJL*

fc*J*£

duly acknowledged to me

that sutih partnership executed the same as i t s free act and
deed.
WITHESS my hand and official seal as of the date first
above v r i t t e
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who being by me duly sworn did

say, that be,
fl/n0Adl
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of MELVILLE LTD., a Otah limited

partnership, and that the within and foregoing instrument was
signed in behalf of such limited partnership and
MtStm

M - M&fv* //*£~

duly acknowledged to ne that

such partnership executed the same as its free act and deed.
WITNESS my hand and official seal as ox. the date first
above written.
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Minute Entry

FILES BISTfUCT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC I 2 2005
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL S ^ S f R W P - ^
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE fyfe UTAH
Deputycierk

PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS
ENTERPRISES, LC, and WHITE
INVESTMENT CO., INC.,
MINUTE ENTRY
Plaintiffs,
Case No.

040915948

vs.
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED HAMBURGERS
OF NEW YORK, INC.,

December 12, 2005

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, The Court heard oral
argument with respect to the motion on December 12, 2005.
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the
following ruling.
With their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages and the
demolition of a traffic island which marks the edge of the drivethrough lane at a Wendy's restaurant on 3300 South.
Specifically, with this motion, Defendant argues the island
has marked the edge of the drive-through lane since 1982,
accordingly, the statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs'
trespass and breach of contract causes of action ran years ago.
Moreover, contends Defendant, the traffic island's location is
authorized by the Declaration of Restrictions and Grants of
Easements (the "Declaration") governing Plaintiffs' and Wendy's
properties. Indeed, asserts Defendant, the Declaration clearly
contemplates Wendy's operation of a drive-through restaurant and
Plaintiffs granted an express easement appurtenant for the
purpose of providing vehicular access to the restaurant.1 Even
x

Using this same reasoning, Defendant seeks summary judgment
on Plaintiffs' final cause of action that Defendant breached the
Declaration by maintaining a pair of menu-board signs. According
to Defendant, the signs are a normal and necessary feature of
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if the Declaration were not read in such a manner, it is
Defendant's position that since Wendy's and its predecessors have
used the drive-through continuously for more than 20 years, they
are the owner of a prescriptive easement. Finally, Defendant
seeks fees as provided for in the Declaration.
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing there is no
prescriptive easement as this requires maintaining a balance
between the rights of the fee title owner and the purported
easement holder, and in this case, the use is exclusively for
Wendy's and its patrons. Moreover, contend Plaintiffs, nothing
in the Declaration allows drive-through facilities and at most,
the Declaration permits two signs on Parcel Three. As for
Defendant's claim that Plaintiffs' causes of action are time
barred, Plaintiffs note it is undisputed that the earliest that
Wendy's obtained possession of its property and commenced the
remodeling of the former Burger King restaurant was on February
28, 2003. Accordingly, argue Plaintiffs, none of the limitations
referred to by Defendant's could have run prior to the filing of
Plaintiffs' Complaint.
After reviewing the record in this matter, as well as the
applicable Utah law, the Court finds the proper focus in a
statute of limitations analysis is the time at which the cause of
action accrued, not the identity of the parties involved. See
Utah Dep't

of Envlt.

Quality

v.

Redd,

2002 UT 50, % 16, 48 P.3d

230 (citing
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1). While Plaintiffs' suggest
the trespass is continuing, rather than permanent and, therefore,
their lawsuit is timely, the Court disagrees. At issue in this
case is a landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, which is
considerably more permanent than the pile of "rocks, soil, and
other debris" which constituted the act of trespass contested in
Brieggar

Properties,

L.C.

V. H.E.

Davis

& Sons,

Inc.,

2002 UT

1953, p.11, 52 P.3d 1133. This said, it is undisputed the
alleged trespass and breach of the Declaration occurred in or
about 1982 and, consequently, the causes of action are time
barred.
Based upon the forgoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted. Defendant is asked to prepare the
appropriate affidavit of fees and submit the same for
consideration by the Courtg

drive-through restaurants.
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DATED t h i s

A

d a y of December,

2005
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DISTB/ICT-

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 040915948 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s

loL day of

J)g^

NAME
TODD J GODFREY
ATTORNEY PLA
2118 E 3900 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84124
MICHAEL Z HAYES
ATTORNEY PLA
2118 E 3900 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84124
RONALD G RUSSELL
ATTORNEY DEF
185 S STATE ST STE 1300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

20 05

$ *

Deputy Court Clerk

March 21,2006
Minute Entry

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL-DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF ^^^THlCf cou
.
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PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS
ENTERPRISES, L.C.; and WHITE
INVESTMENT CO., INC.,
MINUTE ENTRY

D

<*M]

Plaintiffs,
Case No.

ycsr

040915948

vs.
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED HAMBURGERS
OF NEW YORK, INC.,

March 17, 2006

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
Judgment and Affidavit and Award of Attorney's Fees, and
Plaintiffs Objection thereto, submitted for decision on March 9,
2006. Oral argument has not been requested.
After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court finds
Plaintiffs' objections are without merit. Accordingly, the Court
overrules the same. Moreover, with respect to attorney fees, the
Court is persuaded Defendant is entitled to an award of fees and
that such fees are reasonable.
Based upon-the forgoing, the Court will enter the proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final Judgment and
enter on the Final Judgment the attorney fees and costs
established by the affidavit of counsel.
This Minute Entry constitutes the order regarding the
matters addressed herein. No further order is required.
DATED this

20k.

day of March, 2006,

w$^m,
ERIC- H
T JUDGE0'-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify tftat on the 21st day of March, 2006, I sent by first
class mail, a true and correct copy of the attached document to the
following:

Ronald G. Russell
185 South State Street
Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0019

Michael Z. Hayes
Todd J. Godfrey
2118 East 3900 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725

^

&
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 040915948PR
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

]

This matter came before the court on December 12,2005 for oral argument on the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New
York, Inc. ("Wendy's"). Ronald G. Russell appeared on behalf of Wendy's. Michael Z. Hayes
and Todd J. Godfrey appeared on behalf of plaintiffs Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises, L.C. and
White Investment Co., Inc. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under

advisement and issued its Minute Entry dated December 12, 2005. Accordingly, the court enters
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The court finds that the following facts are undisputed:
1.

Wendy's owns the real property located at 3259 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City,

Utah (the "Wendy's Property") on which is located a restaurant building and related
improvements.
2.

The Wendy's Property is adjacent to the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the

"Shopping Center"), which is owned by plaintiffs.
3.

Both the Wendy's Property and the Shopping Center are included in the property

described in the Declaration of Restrictions and Grant of Easements (the "Declaration"), which
was recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder on September 12,1982 as
Entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page 823. A copy of the Declaration is attached to the
Affidavit of Lew Swain as Exhibit "A."
4.

The Declaration was signed by both plaintiffs.

5.

The Declaration identifies three distinct parcels of property within the property

described therein. The Wendy's Property is located within what the Declaration refers to as
"Parcel Three."
6.

The Wendy's Property was developed as a Burger King restaurant by The Boyer

Company in or about 1982.

2

7.

At the time the Burger King restaurant was constructed on the Wendy's Property in

or about 1982, a drive through lane was also constructed on the north side of the Wendy's
Property. The drive through lane is bounded on the north by a narrow, landscaped island edged
with concrete curbing, and on the south by the restaurant (the drive through lane and related
island are referred to hereinafter as the "Drive Through Facilities").
8.

The Drive Through Facilities extend from the northwest comer of the restaurant

located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto what is defined by the Declaration as the
"Common Area" of the Shopping Center.
9.

The Plot Plan shows the Drive Through Facilities as two curved lines running from

the northwest comer of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast.
10.

With respect to Parcel Three, the Declaration provides that "[n]o building featuring

drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be located on Parcel Three, except as shown on
the Plot Plan
11.

"
With respect to the "Common Area," the Declaration provides in relevant part as

follows:
Common Area shall be used only for vehicular access, circulation and
parking, pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the Owners
[i.e., the owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains], tenants,
customers, invitees, licensees, agents and employees of the Owners and
business occupants of the buildings constructed in the Shopping Center
[i.e., the owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains], and for
the servicing and supplying of such businesses, except as otherwise
provided herein.... No building, barricade or structure may be placed,
erected or constructed within the Common Area on any parcel except
loading and delivery docks and covered areas attached to such docks, trash
enclosures, outside storage areas .. . pylon (to the extent not herein
3

prohibited) and directional signs, bumper guards or curbs, paving,
landscaping and landscape planters, lighting standards, driveways,
sidewalks, walkways, parking stalls, columns or pillars supporting roof
overhangs, and any other improvements as may be required under
applicable laws, rules, ordinances and regulations of any governmental
body having jurisdiction over the Shopping Center.... The parking and
vehicular traffic patterns for the areas of the Shopping Center which are
designated "Common Area Only" on the Plot Plan [attached to the
Declaration as Exhibit "A"] shall be designed, installed and maintained as
shown on the Plot Plan.
12.

From the time they were constructed in or about 1982 through the present, the

Drive Through Facilities have remained in continuous use in the same location and
configuration.
13.

With respect to signage on Parcel Three, the Declaration states that:
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct two (2)
free-standing pylon, monument or other signs at the location designated on
the Plot Plan as "Parcel Three Sign." No other pylon, monument or other
free-standing sign shall be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior
written approval of all Owners . . . .

14.

In addition to a pylon sign along 3300 South at the south end of Wendy's Property,

and a directional sign located on the Drive Through Facilities, Wendy's maintains two menu
board signs on the Wendy's Property (the "Menu Board Signs").
15.

Menu board signs have existed on the Wendy's Property continuously since 1982.

16.

Menu board signs like the Menu Board Signs are essential to the operation of drive

through restaurants.
17.

The Declaration provides that in the event legal proceedings are brought to enforce

any provision of the Declaration as against any party with an interest in the property described

4

therein, the successful party in the action shall be entitled to recover "a reasonable sum as
attorneys' fees and costs"fromthe other party.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing undisputed facts, the court makes the following Conclusions of
Law:
1.

Plaintiffs' claims for trespass are barred by the three-year statute of limitations

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1).
2.

According to the Utah Supreme Court, the statute of limitations for trespass actions

begins to run as soon as the trespass occurs. See Breiggar Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons,
Inc., 2002 UT 53,1111.
3.

Plaintiffs contend that the alleged trespass is continuing, rather than permanent,

and that the cause of action in this case did not accrue until Wendy's acquired its interest in the
property. The court disagrees.
4.

At issue in this case is a landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, which is

considerably more permanent that the pile of "rocks, soil, and other debris" which constituted the
act of trespass contested in Breiggar Properties. The court, therefore, concludes that the alleged
trespass is permanent and has been so since 1982.
5.

With respect to plaintiffs' contention that the cause of action did not accrue until

Wendy's acquired the property, the court concludes that the proper focus in a statute of
limitations analysis is the time at which the cause of action accrued, not the identity of the parties

5

involved. See Utah Department of Environmental Quality v. Redd, 2002 UT 50 Tf 16 (citing
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-1).
6.

The same analysis applies to plaintiffs1 claims for breach of contract with respect to

the Drive Through Facilities and signage.
7.

Inasmuch as the Declaration is a written contract, a six year statute of limitation

applies to actions for breach of contract under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2).
8•

Both breaches of the Declaration plaintiffs allege occurred well over six years

before this action was commenced.
9.

Although the Declaration generally forbids the construction of improvements on

common areas, it expressly authorizes Drive Through Facilities located on Parcel Three as
shown on the Plot Plan.
10.

The Drive Through Facilities are consequently excepted from the Declaration's

general prohibition of improvements on the Common Area and are, in fact, expressly permitted.
11.

Because the Drive Through Facilities are expressly permitted by the Declaration,

Wendy's is entitled to a declaratory judgment decreeing that the Drive Through Facilities may
remain in use in their present location and configuration.
12.

The court further rejects plaintiffs' contention that the Declaration prohibits

Wendy's from maintaining Menu Board Signs.
13.

The Declaration prohibits any "pylon, monument or other free-standing sign" on

Parcel Three in addition to the pair of free standing signs expressly permitted thereby. The
Declaration, however, does not prohibit Menu Board Signs.
6

14.

Moreover, the Declaration expressly contemplates and permits the operation of a

drive through restaurant on Parcel Three. Signage like Menu Board Signs is an inherently
necessary feature of modern drive through restaurants.
15.

Wendy's is entitled to a declaratory judgment decreeing that the Menu Board Signs

may remain in use in their present location and configuration.
16.

Wendy's is further entitled to an order enjoining plaintiffs from taking any action to

inhibit Wendy's from using and maintaining the Drive Through Facilities and Menu Board Signs
in their present location and configuration.
17.

Because Wendy's is the prevailing party, Wendy's is entitled to an award of its

costs and attorney fees. Based on the Affidavit of Ronald G. Russell, the court concludes that a
&

reasonable attorney fee in this action is $

and that Wendy's is entitled to an

ltd'

award of its costs totaling $
DATED this
is

/ZZr^y °f

m4i-,.

2006

7

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Michael Z. Hayes, Esq.
Todd J. Godfrey, Esq. of
MAZURAN & HAYES
Attopflteys for Plaint

RonahsDur. Kussell, Esq.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the / * * day of January, 2006 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, postage prepaid,
to:
Michael Z. Hayes, Esq.
Todd J. Godfrey, Esq.
MAZURAN & HAYES
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124-1725

9

Final Judgment

FILES 2S37RICT COURT

MAGE

Third Judicial District

MAR 2 I 2006
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134)
By.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS
ENTERPRISES, L.C.; and WHITE
INVESTMENT CO., INC.,
FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.

WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED
HAMBURGERS OF NEW YORK, INC.,

Civil No. 040915948PR
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

The court having issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and for the reasons
set forth therein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and all causes of action therein be and the same is
hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, for no cause of action.
2. The court grants judgment in favor of defendant on its Counterclaim as follows:
Final Judgment @J

